wide-scale conflict the world had not yet seen. It meant death, destruction, and suffering for all involved. The campaign in Eastern Europe has been studied for decades, and an abundance of historical literature on the subject has been written and is widely available. However, in War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941, military historian Geoffrey P.
Megargee asserts that there are shortcomings in this literature. He believes scholars have formed a narrative that fails to link Nazi military campaigns with crimes against humanity. This narrative is part of what Megargee calls "the dual myth of German military genius and moral correctness" (xii). Why is this "myth" commonly held as truth? He insists it is a combination of overreliance on former Nazi generals' accounts (they placed all responsibility on Hitler or the SS), lack of access to records and documents, and post-war Cold War politics that painted the Soviets as malicious and thus the source of brutality. Another reason he cites is the habit of military historians to consider Nazi military affairs and its acts of genocide separately. By focusing on each one exclusively, they fail to connect the two. Therefore, Megargee's goal is to show how the Wehrmacht was more intertwined with the Nazi liquidation policies and atrocities than most realize. Furthermore, he seeks to demonstrate why and how Hitler and the Germans fell short of completing their objectives in Russia. This review will pinpoint and examine the author's major arguments, while also offering detailed analysis and evaluation of his methods and the overall work.
Before describing the cruelty and horrors inflicted by the SS, Einsatzgruppen, and the Wehrmacht, Megargee explains that the "war of annihilation" in the east had long-term racial, cultural, and national roots. He notes that feelings of German superiority emerged in the late nineteenth century and only increased after the First World War. Distrust and contempt for Slavs, Jews, and Bolsheviks grew alongside this nationalism. Hitler fed off this pent-up, postwar resentment and advocated the need for Lebensraum and preparation for an inevitable racial struggle. In terms of military strategy, the author observes that German commanders had long been promoting the ideas of total war and maximum violence to ensure the physical and emotional breakdown of the enemy (2-7). This was certainly evident during the invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939. During the occupation, the SS, Einsatzgruppen, and the German army cooperated to target and eradicate "undesirables." Even during this initial stage of the war, Hitler had stated, "The goal of the war lies not in reaching a certain line, but in the physical destruction of the enemy" (15). Nationalism, racism, anti-Semitism, past war tactics, and the methods employed in Poland laid the groundwork for how future fighting was to be conducted on the Eastern Front.
Shortly after the decision to invade the Soviet Union, plans began to be formulated.
Megargee points out that the message from the Nazi military brass was that the war in the east was to be one of extermination. Commander-in-Chief Walther von Brauchitsch told his senior commanders that the troops "have to realize that this struggle is being waged by one race against another, and [that they should] proceed with the necessary harshness" (33). SS functionary Herbert Backe's "Hunger Plan" (34) exemplified the indifference to human life that the Nazis Why did the Germans ultimately suffer defeat on the Eastern Front? Megargee claims it was the result of poor planning and internal friction. Hitler and the Nazis greatly underestimated the size, strength, and will of the Soviet army. Some may say this was due to the Germans' hubris and sense of racial superiority, but Megargee also blames a lack of reliable intelligence.
The military historian adds that Nazi leaders ignored serious obstacles regarding logistics (57-58, 103, 112). They did not consider the scale of the theater in which they were fighting, nor did they concoct a backup plan for the operation. Weather was another factor not accounted for. In the early months of the campaign, rain turned roads into mud pits, making them nearly impassable. Thus, it became difficult to transport fuel and supplies. In the later months, the severe winter took a toll on the Wehrmacht, as soldiers were not prepared (they had neither enough clothing nor shelter) to take on the snow and sub-zero temperatures. The author insists that indecision among the top Nazi brass was key. Hitler, his advisors, and his army generals often could not find common ground when it came to military strategy. For example, the dictator wanted to invade the Ukraine and extract its oil and other vital economic assets, but others such as OKH Chief Franz Halder stressed the importance of toppling the Soviet capital of Moscow first. Megargee writes that these quarrels were commonplace, convincing some advisors and army leaders that they would have to manipulate Hitler, or at least attempt to work around the orders they disagreed with (78-82). Later in the campaign, after a decline in German performance, Hitler began relieving generals who defied his orders. He even took over as head of army operations (137-140). Hitler's obduracy and fanaticism created a tense atmosphere, one that detracted from the effectiveness and efficiency of the military process. Megargee examined and analyzed both German and English texts, speeches from the era, formal SS/Einsatzgruppen reports, and even journal entries of army group commanders. These journal entries are essential, since they provide a mostly unfettered view of what these Nazis were probably thinking. The only possible criticism is that not enough sources portraying the invasion from the Soviet perspective were included; accounts from Russian soldiers, POWs, partisans, or civilians would have been informative and impactful (Megargee also should have spent more time discussing the fact that the Soviet Union was able to defend itself against the Nazis despite little economic or military assistance from Britain or the United States). 2 In regards to sources, the reader will be pleased to find a bibliographic essay at the book's end, one that recommends works on similar subjects and offers a sense of how the author culled his material.
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One must admire the way Megargee structures his book. It is a consistent two- 
